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1. Introduction 
Many countries are faced with the decision of whether to become part of a regional 
supranational institution, be it in Europe, the Americas or in Asia. In many cases countries 
join if they are offered the opportunity, but some do not. With respect to Europe it may be 
quite surprising that a small, economically highly developed and, with the rest of Europe, 
culturally deeply enrooted state in the centre of Europe is not a member of the European 
Union (EU). The question arises how to evaluate the Swiss strategy toward European 
integration: “Should the country join the EU immediately, given that it is likely to join the 
EU some time in future?” Or put in a slightly different way: “Should a country join the EU 
immediately if it is believed that the expected net benefits are currently greater than the 
expected costs of accession?” This is the main question we would like to address in this 
paper. Our answer will be: “not necessarily”. The aim of this paper is thus to introduce a, to 
some extent, new perspective on the question of accession to the EU by applying the so-
called “theory of investment under uncertainty” to this problem and discussing it on the 
background of the Swiss case. Thereby, we believe it is quite remarkable how much we can 
get out of a simplified model of this otherwise very demanding and complex theory. 
In Switzerland there exist basically two opinions on the question of entry in the EU. 
On the one hand, there are the advocates of an accession to the EU. These exponents tend to 
ask for an immediate entry, or at least for immediate negotiations about an accession to the 
EU. On the other side, there are exponents who request to pull back the membership 
application that the government has deposited in Brussels in 1992. They are convinced that 
Switzerland should not--probably never--join the EU. The main argument of the “fast-
accession fraction” is that the interests of Switzerland in Europe and vis-à-vis third countries 
can be much better pursued as a member of the EU than as an outsider. The “never-
accession fraction” argues the exact opposite that the Swiss interests are much better served 
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not being a member of the EU. The situation seems to be deadlocked. “Are you in favour or 
against an entry in the EU” has become the crucial question. 
To get an answer to the question many studies have been published throughout the 
last 10 to 15 years. These include the “Hauser-Report” for Switzerland (Hauser and Bradke, 
1992) which, similar to the Cecchini-Report for the European Community (EC), projected 
an increase of the Swiss GDP by 4 to 6% in case of a Swiss membership to the European 
Economic Area (EEA) or EC. Other studies include Bundesrat (1999), Hauser and 
Zimmermann (1999), Koellreuter (1999), Economiesuisse (2000), UBS (2000) and Hauser 
and Roitinger (2001) which, in principle, all try to simulate and approximate the net effects 
of various integration scenarios on the Swiss GDP. Interpreted from the perspective of an 
investment decision for a whole country, these studies take an approach which fits the 
traditional investment theory that basically compares the discounted expected net benefits 
with the accession costs for different scenarios. 
We argue that this approach has four major shortcomings. First, this decision rule 
does not explicitly take into account that if a country once has joined the EU, the decision is, 
de facto, irreversible. Note that irreversibility does not require that leaving the EU at a later 
point in time is impossible. It rather assumes that entry is costly and that these costs are sunk 
as will be shown later. Second, the decision rule does not fully and explicitly take into 
account that the future development of the benefits and costs is uncertain and that the degree 
of uncertainty may change over time. Third, it ignores the possibility to join the EU at a later 
point in time which, in principle, has a value and thus should be considered. Finally, both 
the economic and political costs and benefits should certainly be taken into account when 
considering an accession to an institution such as the EU. 
We believe a unified framework is currently lacking that eliminates the shortcomings 
of existing discussions and thus allows capturing the opportunities and risks of a 
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membership in one setting. The theory of investment under uncertainty (Dixit and Pindyck, 
1994) applied to a whole country is, in our view, able to exactly offer this framework. It 
provides the rationale for a possible third position about Swiss EU-membership which 
proposes to wait in order to keep the option to join at a later stage if conditions turn out to be 
advantageous. Waiting thus incorporates a value, in principle, if the benefits and costs of 
EU-membership are characterized by uncertainty. The value of this flexibility option may, 
however, become negative if, for example, an immediate accession is likely to provide 
considerable benefits that are foregone by a waiting country. 
Thus, the goal of this paper is to analyse how the so-called value of waiting depends 
on determinants which are of crucial importance in the decision to join an economic and 
political union such as the EU. We believe that our two-period model, based on Dixit and 
Pindyck (1994, p. 26-30), provides interesting insights to the question with respect to an 
accession to a supranational institution. The model, for example, predicts that the higher the 
uncertainty associated with the net political and economic benefits of an accession, the 
higher is the value of waiting. We argue that uncertainty has increased for Switzerland since 
the Maastricht agreement. The model’s predictions seem also to be in line with both the 
behaviour of Switzerland as well as the ten countries which recently joined the EU in 2004. 
For example, we argue that the EU-specific accession costs are much higher for 
Switzerland, whereas the net benefits seem to be relatively smaller, in part because of the 
existence of the Bilateral Agreements I and II that have recently been negotiated between 
the EU and Switzerland.  
The idea is, of course, not entirely new. Dewatripont and Roland (1995) discuss the 
design of large-scale reform packages in transition economies that “involve great aggregate 
and individual uncertainty” (p. 1208). One of their conclusions is that under certain 
conditions a gradual approach to reform is preferred to a big-bang approach because it 
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“generates a higher investment response because of a lower option value of waiting” (p. 
1207). In contrast to this paper, we completely focus on the timing aspect of one strategy 
(i.e. accession) and we regard the decision of the government itself as an investment with 
uncertain economic and political costs and benefits. Begg et al. (2003) discuss the economic 
consequences for U.K. of staying outside the Euro Zone. Interestingly, the comprehensive 
study describes this decision as a “temporary delay” which is “an option with a price” (p. 5) 
in the executive summary. However, this aspect is not fully developed in the study which 
mainly focuses on the benefits and costs of introducing the Euro (e.g. on interest rates) 
without referring to the uncertainty itself. This contrasts with our paper that puts the value of 
waiting and its determinants at the centre of the analysis.  
 The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents a simplified 
two-period model to discuss the optimal timing of accession to a supranational institution. 
Section 3 derives and discusses the comparative statics of the model. Section 4 deepens the 
thoughts by decomposing the value of waiting into a benefit- and cost-element and by 
evaluating the results of the model from the perspective of three periods. Section 5 applies 
the results to a brief analysis of the Swiss case, also by comparing it with the accession of 
Eastern European countries to the EU. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. A Simple Two-Period Model of Accession 
We interpret the accession of a country like Switzerland to a supranational institution such 
as the EU as (1) an irreversible investment that (2) provides net annual benefits which are 
uncertain. 
 The first aspect of this interpretation is supported by Haubrich and Ritter (1999, p. 1) 
who state that, in general, „the decision to commit to a policy is like the decision to make an 
irreversible investment; the policymaker and/or society bear some cost generated in the 
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political system or by the economic costs associated with the adjustment to the new policy, 
but once the policy is in place, this is a sunk cost, and reversal is also costly.”  In the case of 
the EU, for example, the costs of investment are associated with the adoption of the “acquis 
communautaire”, a corpus of approximately 100’000 pages of guidelines, bye-laws and 
laws. Adjusting a country’s legal, political and economic framework to the “aquis 
communautaire” has one-time costs -- administrative costs of changing and implementing 
the laws and decrees, economic costs of adjusting the economy’s structure to a change in 
prices and political costs due to a change in the political system and its impact on the 
representation of people’s preferences in politics. Note that the investment is irreversible or 
sunk because the investment costs incurred can not be recuperated if a country having joined 
the EU decides to pull out at a later stage. 
 The second aspect of this interpretation is obvious and hardly new: joining the EU 
leads to net annual benefits that are uncertain. Annual benefits may, for example, include 
economic gains from market integration (e.g. better accesss to the EU market) and political 
gains from a marginal effect on the decisions made in the EU institutions or from an image 
improvement to be part of the club. Annual costs arise because of yearly payments in the 
regional adjustment fund or the loss of seignorage as a consequence of joining the European 
Monetary Union (EMU). The important point we want to emphasize is that the degree of 
uncertainty regarding the net annual benefits is likely to change over time. For example, the 
political gains from affecting the decisions in EU institutions or the yearly payments to the 
regional adjustment fund depend on the voting schemes and power of the various EU 
institutions that are currently under review. 
 The joint existence of irreversibility and uncertainty implies that a country joining 
the EU today gives up the possibility of waiting for new information to arrive that could 
affect the desirability of joining the EU. Giving up this option is costly. This new 
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information covers aspects about the likely development of the supranational institution 
(number of members, economic policy) as well as of the outsider country in case of non-
accession (likelihood of policy reforms).1 We now move to the model that allows to study 
under which condition waiting is a preferred strategy. The model is based on Dixit and 
Pindyck (1994, p. 26-30). 
 Suppose a country that plans to join a supranational institution. There exists an 
expected net annual benefit, E(Vt), which occurs for ever in each period, t, as soon as the 
country joins the institution.2 There is an investment, It, which is a one-time cost that is 
required in period t when a country commits to join the supranational entity. Let us first 
assume that the country is faced with the decision "to join now or never" in period t0. In this 
case, a social planner should compare the expected net annual benefit, E(Vt), discounted at 
the time preference, i, with the investment costs, I0, in period 0. Based on this (traditional) 
approach, the country should be recommended to join the supranational institution if the net 
present value (NPV) in period 0 is positive. Thus,  
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As pointed out by McDonald and Siegel (1986) and developed by Dixit and Pindyck (1994) 
this decision rule is not sufficient if an investment can be postponed to period 1. Note that 
the decision in equation (1) is based on the expected values of Vt. In reality, however, Vt 
may turn out to be lower or higher as discussed above. This uncertainty can be most easily 
introduced by assuming that two states of the world are possible (“good” or “bad”) 
associated with high (VtH) or low (VtL) net annual benefits where VtH realizes with 
                                                 
1 An increase in the number of members raises the economic discrimination effects on outsiders as shown by 
Baldwin (1995) in his “domino theory”. Furthermore, some of the advantages of integration could, in 
principle, be captured independently of the accession if the country, for example, managed to strengthen its 
competition policy and liberalize the internal market as argued in the above mentioned Hauser-Report (Hauser 
and Bradke (1992, p. 259) but questioned by Borner and Bodmer (2004, p. 223) in their analysis of the recent 
growth performance of Switzerland. 
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probability p and VtL with probability 1-p. In order to simplify and stress the point, we 
assume that the state of the world is fully revealed in period 1. Figure 1 gives an illustration 
of the pay-offs and the timing. 
     Insert Figure 1 
From the standpoint of the country deciding whether to join or not to join, these 
developments can become crucial. If, in period 1, Vt turns out to be low (VtL) permanently, 
the country may regret its decision in period 0. In other words, to wait until period 1 and to 
join only when Vt is high (VtH) may be the better decision to take in period 0. We, again, 
calculate the net present value in period 0 (NPVH) of waiting until period 1 and only joining 
the supranational institution by investing in period 1, I1, if the good state of the world, VtH, 
is revealed in period 1 and thereafter. Thus, 
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In order to decide whether “to wait or not to wait”, we have to compare the two net present 
values. A positive difference between NPVH and NPV implies that there is a value to wait 
(W) rather than to invest now. By subtracting (1) from (2) we find: 
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If W is positive waiting has a positive value which implies that the country should wait and 
join tomorrow if the good state of nature occurs.3 W is the value of this “flexibility option”. 
It can be optimal to wait for a country if the future development is uncertain and the 
investment irreversible. The intuition is that waiting to period 1 increases the information (in 
our simple case the uncertainty completely vanishes in period 1). By waiting the country 
                                                                                                                                                      
2 We could also interpret E(Vt) as the expected utility of a representative resident. 
3 If we interpret E(Vt) as the expected utility, the decision rule in equation (3) implies that the representative 
resident is risk neutral as E(Vt) is calculated as the weighted average of VtH and VtL. 
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gets the opportunity to join only if the good case realizes and to avoid becoming a member 
of the supranational institution in the bad case. Waiting incorporates this flexibility. As 
shown by equation (3) the value of waiting or enjoying this flexibility may also be negative 
which implies that the country should not wait and thus join in period 0.4 
 The sunkness of It is important because, otherwise, a country could join in period 0 
based on its expectations and exit again in period 1 if the bad case unexpectedly occurs and 
recuperate the accession costs. If, however, It is sunk the country only faces this flexibility if 
it waits to join until period 1. In fact, with It being sunk the country would never exit in 
period 1, even in the bad case, as long as VtL is positive or if exit costs are high enough. 
Therefore, the key aspect of the assumption of the irreversibility of investment is not that the 
drop out of a supranational institution such as the EU is costly, but rather that entry is 
associated with costs that are sunk. Another interesting aspect that can be derived from 
equations (1) to (3) is that the value of waiting, W, may be positive despite of the fact that 
the cost of joining a supranational institution increases over time. This increase of the 
accession costs over time is illustrated in Figure 1 by the bigger dotted bar representing I1 
(I0<I1). This is a point we will come back to below. In the next Section, we want to discuss 
the determinants of the value of waiting. 
 
3. The Determinants of the Value of Waiting 
We first concentrate on how the degree of uncertainty affects the value of waiting, W, and 
then derive how W depends on changes in the costs of accesssion (It), the probability of the 
good state of nature to occur (p) and the time preference (i). 
 
                                                 
4 Note that we disregard the possibility that the annual benefits depend on whether the country waits until 
period 1 or not. An argument in favour of taking this aspect into account would be firms that increase their 
private investment if the country commits to enter the supranational institution.  
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3.1. Uncertainty 
In the model, an increase in the degree of uncertainty can be studied by a mean-preserving 
increase of the spread of the net annual benefits, i.e. by an increase of VtH and a decrease of 
VtL, assuming that the expected net annual benefit, E(Vt), stays the same. This exercise is 
described in Figure 1 by the dotted lines that lead to the net annual benefits VtH‘ or VtL’, 
respectively. We take equation (3) and assume that the costs of entry do not change over 
time, i.e. I=I0=I1. Thus, 
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Given the unchanged expected stream of net annual benefits, E(Vt), equation (4) implies that 
the value of waiting increases with an increase in the degree of uncertainty: 0>=∂
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This implies that for each unit of additional net annual benefits in the good case ( HtV∂ ) 
NPVH and thus W rises by the expected value (p) of the annuity (1/i) of this event, whereas 
NPV remains unaffected. The rationale for this result is that an increase in uncertainty 
makes it more valuable for a country to wait and only to join if, in period 1, the good case 
occurs, thereby preventing of being “captured” if the bad case occurs. 
 Equation (4) also shows that an increase in the expected net annual benefits (E(Vt)), 
leaving VtH constant, reduces the value of waiting as .0
)(
<∂
∂
tVE
W Note that this situation 
occurs if, e.g., VtL increases. The bad case becomes less bad, or, in other words, the 
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“downward uncertainty” is reduced. Inspection of equation (4) shows the reason for this 
result: NPV rises, whereas NPVH stays the same. The option to wait and only to join in the 
good case becomes relatively less attractive. This result is, of course, consistent with the 
comparative statics regarding a change of the mean-preserving spread. We basically reduce 
the spread and thus the degree of uncertainty which should, as derived above, reduce the 
value of waiting. Proposition 1 summarizes our findings: 
Proposition 1: The value of waiting (W) rises if the uncertainty regarding the future net 
annual benefits of accession -- interpreted as the spread between the benefits in the good 
and the bad state of nature -- increases. 
 
3.2. Comparative Statics Regarding the other Determinants 
We now want to discuss how the value of waiting depends on changes in the other variables 
and parameters, i.e. the costs of accession (It), the probability (p) of the two states of nature 
and the time preference (i). In order to do so, we derive the comparative statics for the value 
of waiting by replacing E(Vt) in equation (4) with its determinants, still assuming that 
I=I0=I1. Thus,  
= [ ]
.)1)(1()
1
1(
)1()1()
1
1(
)1(
)1(
1
L
t
H
t
L
t
H
t
H
t
L
t
H
t
L
t
H
t
H
t
V
i
ippV
i
pI
i
iVppV
i
pV
i
pI
VppV
i
VppVI
i
V
i
IpW
+−−−+−=
=−−−++++−
=

 −++−++−−

 ++
−=
   (5)  
Equation (5) predicts that higher costs, I, of joining the supranational institution in period 0 
and period 1 raise the value of waiting as .0>∂
∂
I
W  The reason is that this makes the 
accession less beneficial and thus lowers the value of both strategies, immediate accession 
and possible accession in period 1. However, as can be seen by inspection of the first 
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bracket term of equation (5) NPVH decreases by a smaller extent because, first, the increase 
in I is discounted and, second, enters only with the probability of the good case to occur. 
Therefore, it becomes more attractive to wait and, thus, only to commit to these higher 
investment costs if the good state of nature occurs.5 
 We also derive equation (5) with respect to VtH and VtL, respectively. Thus,  
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An increase in VtH leads to a lower value to wait. This may come as a surprise, given the 
discussion in Section 3.1. Note, however, that we do not preserve the mean in this exercise. 
The cause for the result above can be seen by inspection of equation (5): NPVH, i.e. the first 
bracket term, increases which for itself should lead to an increase in the value of waiting. 
However, this effect is overcompensated by an increase in NPV as the second bracket term 
is raised twice. The reason is that the increase in VtH raises E(Vt) already in period 0 and not 
only with probability, p, and discounted as in the case of NPVH. Thus, NPV rises by more 
than NPVH. Intuitively, the good case becomes better which increases the expected net 
annual benefits and thus makes it more attractive for a country to join in period 0. To wait 
would imply that the country foregoes a higher expected net annual benefit of accession in 
period 0. An analogous reasoning applies to an increase in VtL. It reduces the “downside 
uncertainty” which makes an immediate accession more attractive. If both occur, i.e. an 
increase in VtH and VtL, the value of waiting also decreases with an increase in E(Vt). 
Proposition 2: The value of waiting (W) is greater, the higher are the costs of accession (It) 
to the supranational institution in period 0 and in per  iod 1 and the lower are the net 
annual benefits in the good case (VtH) and/or in the bad case (VtL). 
 
                                                 
5 Note that we are considering a level effect here where both I0 and I1 increase by the same amount. We will 
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Let us finally determine how the value of waiting depends on the probability of the good 
state of nature to occur, p, and the time preference, i. Based on equation (5) we find the 
following result for the first derivative of W with respect to the probability, p: 
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Equation (7) reveals that we cannot sign the first derivative. However, it can be shown that 
0<∂
∂
p
W  if W>0. In other words, the value of waiting decreases with an increase of p if a 
country’s value of waiting is currently positive. The reason for this result can again be 
understood by inspection of equation (5): an increase of p implies that NPV increases by 
more than NPVH due to the increased expected net annual benefits in period 0 in case of an 
immediate accession. In addition, NPVH falls due to an increase in the expected accession 
costs (pI) in period 1. Intuitively, a higher probability of the good state of nature to occur 
makes it more attractive to join the supranational institution, in general, and thus reduces the 
value of the flexibility option not to join if the bad state of nature should realize in period 1. 
 Taking the first derivative of equation (5) with respect to i allows us to discuss how 
the value of waiting depends on the time preference. We find that it is positive: 
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This implies that the value of waiting increases if people become impatient which, again, 
may sound surprising. An inspection of equation (3) and (5) helps to explain the result. If i 
rises, both NPV and NPVH fall because of a decrease of the net present value of the stream 
of future benefits from accession. An accession becomes generally less attractive. Note, 
however, that NPVH decreases by less than NPV because of two reasons. First, an increase 
of the time preference has a greater negative effect on NPV than on NPVH, because the 
                                                                                                                                                      
consider a dynamic effect where I may increase over time in Section 4.  
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value to be discounted is larger in case of immediate accession.6 Second, the negative effect 
on NPVH is partly compensated by a reduction of the discounted value of the accession 
costs, I, in period 1. Both effects thus increase the value of waiting. The intuition is as 
follows: if people become impatient their opportunity costs of current consumption are high. 
This implies that they are more reluctant to give up current consumption. Therefore, they 
would rather wait to join the supranational institution because, in this case, the investment 
costs can be postponed into the future. Furthermore, the stream of expected future benefits 
of an immediate accession falls relative to that of an accession in period 1 in the good case. 
Proposition 3: The value of waiting (W) decreases with an increase in the probability of the 
good state of nature to occur, given that W>0, and it increases if people become impatient. 
 
4. Interpretation of our Findings 
Let us first focus on the costs of waiting and discuss to which extent and whether they are 
included in our framework. We then interpret our findings from the perspective of three 
periods. 
 
4.1. The Costs of Waiting as a Component in the Value of Waiting   
Suppose the costs of accession rise from I0 to I1. In this case, waiting is “costly” in the sense 
that a country has to pay more to join the supranational institution if it delays accession. As 
stated above, this does not inevitably mean that the value of waiting becomes zero or 
negative. The potential for an upward movement from I0 to I1, which makes a country 
indifferent between joining in period 0 or in period 1, can be calculated.7 I1* has to take the 
value which equates NPVH and NPV:  
                                                 
6 E(Vt), is greater than pVt as long as 0<p<1 and VtL>0. 
7 This is also shown in Dixit and Pindyck (1994, p. 28). 
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If It reaches I1* the value of waiting, W, becomes zero. Note that a country may wait to enter 
a supranational institution despite of the fact that I0 rises considerably to I1 as long as 
I1<I1*.This occurs if the flexibility of the country to join later has got a high value. On the 
other hand, if I is likely to rise considerably between period 0 und period 1, then the value of 
waiting might become negative which favours an immediate accession.8  
 When discussing the determinants of the value of waiting we usually faced a trade-
off between some benefits and costs. Note that we can explicitly decompose the value of 
waiting (W) into a benefit- as well as a cost-component. This can be shown by slightly 
reformulating the first line of equation (5) and setting it smaller than zero: 
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The value of waiting (W) is negative if the benefit-component of waiting on the left side is 
smaller than the cost-component on the right side. Note that the benefit-component captures 
the reduced accession costs due to postponing them (discounting with i) to period 1 and the 
possibility of only joining in the good state of nature (p). The cost-component of waiting is 
composed of the unrealized expected net annual benefits in period 0, E(Vt), and the expected 
value of the annuity of the net benefits in the bad case, (1-p)VtL/i. 
 Equation (10) increases our understanding of the comparative statics results derived 
in Section 3. Note that a higher degree of uncertainty reduces the cost-component of waiting 
(VtL gets smaller) while the benefit-component stays the same. This is the basis for the result 
that higher uncertainty raises the value of waiting; it reduces the cost-component of 
                                                 
8 Note that the difference between I0 and I1* is greater than W. As can be seen from equation (3), I1 has to 
increase by more than W in order to reduce W to zero and thus make the country to join the supranational 
institution. This is due to the fact that I1 is discounted and multiplied by the probability of the good state of 
nature to occur.   
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postponing the accession. If the reduction of VtL is not mean-preserving the effect is even 
stronger as E(Vt) also decreases. Vice versa, higher expected benefits, E(Vt), increase the 
cost-component of waiting. Also note that higher accession costs, I, raise the benefit 
component of waiting in equation (10) which is, again, in line with our findings in Section 
3. We now can see more precisely that the value of waiting does take into account the costs 
associated with postponing an accession to the supranational institution. It is only positive if 
the benefit-component is greater than the cost-component. 
 
4.2. Towards a Three-Period Model 
So far, a country has basically the choice between entering the supranational institution in 
period 0 or waiting, and the uncertainty about the state of nature completely vanishes in 
period 1. Let us know think about an extension of the model by introducing a third period 
and by assuming that the uncertainty may not be completely reduced in period 1. Suppose 
that it is only known whether the net annual benefits are likely to be in the upper half of the 
spread or, alternatively, in the lower half as illustrated in Figure 2. In this case, it can be 
shown that a country may decide to wait until period 1 and to join the supranational 
institution even though it has the option to wait until period 2. Figure 2 demonstrates the 
idea which is related to Dixit and Pindyck (1994, p. 42). 
     Insert Figure 2 
Note that, in period 1, some information is revealed about the net annual benefits in period 1 
and in the future. For the very same reason that NPVH can be smaller than NPV and, 
therefore, W is negative in the two-period model, it is possible for NPVHH to be smaller than 
NPVH in this extended version where NPVHH reflects the net present value in period 0 of an 
accession that takes place in period 2, subject to VtHH being revealed. Note that the 
investment strategy is always set in period 0. Delaying the costs of entry, It, to period 2 
 17
increases the benefit-component in the calculation of W as shown in Section 4.1. However, 
the cost-component of waiting may increase by even more. The reason is that the possibility 
of getting VtHH also increases E(VtH) if we enter the “high-return” path which raises NPVH 
(i.e. NPV in period 0 of waiting to period 1 and investing if VtH occurs) and thus makes 
accession in period 1 relatively more attractive. 
 Thus, we can easily construct an example where, even though E(VtH) has to be 
discounted to period 0, the value of waiting between period 0 and 1 is positive, but the value 
of waiting from period 1 to 2 is negative. In other words, NPVHH<NPVH>NPV. To get this 
result the cost-component has to rise by more than the benefit-component of delaying It in 
period 1 by one more period. One could calculate this possibility but the procedure would be 
the same as discussed in Section 3. The key point we want to make here is that it is possible 
that a country may find it optimal to wait from period 0 to period 1 and to enter in period 1 
even though it could wait and thus further postpone a possible accession to period 2.  
 Another interesting point is to consider an increase of the degree of uncertainty over 
time. In Figure 2, this would mean that the spread between VtHH and VtHL  as well as 
between VtLH and VtLL is bigger than the one between VtH and VtL. Based on the insight 
from the two-period model, it is straight-forward to show that the value of waiting from 
period 1 to 2 is high , whereas the value of waiting between period 0 and 1 may be rather 
small. This implies that the value of waiting may fluctuate over periods and might increase 
based on changes in the degree of uncertainty over time. In more advanced models with a 
continuous time treatment the value of waiting W smoothly fluctuates in time. The basic 
idea and conclusions are the same as in the simple model. The trade-off between the gains 
and the costs of waiting determines the “optimal” point of accession. 
 Suppose, as a special case and final thought about a changing degree of uncertainty, 
that the uncertainty regarding the net annual benefits is not reduced in period 1 at all. There 
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is no additional information that is revealed in period 1. In this case, a country that decided 
to wait in period 0 because of a positive value to wait would continue to wait. If nothing 
changes, the country may wait “forever”. The question arises what the country will do if, 
already in period 0, it is expected that the degree of uncertainty will never change. One 
might argue that, in this case, the country may never join the supranational institution. 
However, this seems only to be the case if the country considers the decision to join after 
each period as time evolves. Given the insight that accession will never happen in case of 
great unchanging uncertainty, we are left with a choice between joining in period 0 or not to 
join at all. Thus, in this special case, we seem to be back to the orthodox decision rule: a 
country should join the supranational institution if the net present value of an immediate 
accession is greater than zero. Section 5 now applies our findings to the Swiss case and its 
relationship to, for example, the recent accession of the Eastern European countries. 
 
5. Application: The Swiss Case in the Light of the Recent EU-Enlargement 
In May 2004, another major EU-enlargement has officially been settled. The number of 
members increased from 15 to 25 countries including the new members Poland, Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Slowakia, Slovenia, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Cyprus and Malta. 
There are more candidates in the waiting queue. The framework described in this paper 
should help to explain why some countries join the EU faster than others and, in particular, 
why a country like Switzerland seems to observe a higher value of waiting than others. In 
the following we assess the Swiss case based on the comparative statics results of the model 
derived above. 
First, let us consider the costs of accession or investment (I). Proposition 2 states that 
countries with lower administrative, economic and political costs of accession should join 
earlier. We argue that the specific accession costs due to the EU-membership are higher for 
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Switzerland than, for example, for the new member countries of the Eastern European 
enlargement. Certainly, the new member countries have had and have big adjustment costs 
to bear in order to converge to the economic and political requirements established by the 
EU: (i) adoption of the “aquis communautaire” with implications regarding the rule of law, 
the property rights and the state’s interference in the market economies, (ii) implementation 
of institutional stability, human rights and protection for minorities, as well as (iii) 
acceptance of the market forces with all their short-term negative effects on some industries 
and employees. The challenges from these reforms are huge. The point is, however, that 
most of these changes were due regardless of becoming a member of the EU and are thus 
“normal” adjustments in the development process of those countries. In other words, the 
incremental investment costs of EU-membership may be quite small for these countries. 
In contrast, Switzerland faces substantial accession costs in a number of areas which 
are specific to the accession, i.e. they would not arise if the country decided to stay outside 
of the EU. There is, for example, the cost of reorganizing the political system due to the 
unique form of semi-direct democracy: “One persistently special thing about Switzerland, 
however, is its political system. Its mix of federalism and direct democracy makes it 
different from any other country in the world, and affects every other aspect of life”.9 An 
EU membership would require substantial adjustments in the area of allocation of executive 
power or limitation of the public rights as, for example, shown by Freiburghaus (2003, pp. 
13). Another important adjustment cost can be seen in the real interest rate shock associated 
with an EMU-membership. Real Swiss interest rates are about 1 to 2% lower than those in 
the EMU and there is some debate about the causes and desirability of this situation.10 The 
important point to make is that a jump of the real interest rate will have considerable 
distributive effects (e.g. an increase of mortgages and rents), even though, for the exporting 
                                                 
9 “Switzerland: A special case”, The Economist, 2004, February 14th-20th, p. 18. 
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industry, some of the increase is likely to be “neutralized” by a real depreciation of the 
Swiss Franc. 
 Second, we look at the net annual benefits in the good and the bad case (VtH and VtL, 
respectively). Proposition 2 states that a higher potential good case (or bad case) reduces the 
value to wait as both raise the expected net annual benefits. We argue that, from this 
perspective, the value of waiting is lower for the new members of the EU than for 
Switzerland. Note that how good the good case is (VtH), depends on where you stand. A 
rough measure for the upside potential of an EU-membership is the difference between a 
new member’s GDP per capita and the average income of the current EU-members. This 
implies that the upside potential of one of the 10 countries that joined the EU in May 2004 is 
about 100%, whereas in case of Switzerland the GDP per capita is about 150% of the EU-
average and is only exceeded by the EU-member Luxembourg. Of course, also Switzerland 
has an upside potential because of the effects from better market integration which are likely 
to increase with the EU-enlargement as stated in Baldwin’s (1995) “domino theory” and 
empirically supported by Sapir’s (2001) analysis of the exports of the members of the 
European Free Trade Association (EFTA) in the 1990s. However, the Bilateral Agreements 
I and II--the first of which was definitely agreed and implemented in 2002--considerably 
reduce the additional benefits from an economic integration which are specific to an EU-
membership. Also, it seems that the annual costs of, for example, giving up the right to issue 
an own currency are substantial. “Our results indicate that Switzerland would be the third 
largest contributor of seigniorage within the EMU in absolute terms after Germany and 
Spain. In relative terms, the Swiss per capita contribution would be more than four times as 
high as the German contribution.”11   
                                                                                                                                                      
10 See, for example, Brunetti and Hefeker (1998), UBS (2000). 
11  Fischer, Jordan and Lack (2002), p. 79 
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 How about the net annual benefits in the bad case (VtL)? In our view, the “acquis 
communautaire” and the currently proposed new European Constitutional Treaty are 
important in this respect. From an economic or an efficiency point of view, it is clear that 
not all tasks of the public authority should be executed at the same governmental level. The 
key determinants are “externalities” and “economies of scale”. Centralization in the wrong 
areas leads to inefficient regulations and reduces the net annual benefits from membership. 
In their recent analysis “Is Europe going too far?” Alesina and Wacziarg (1999, p. 35) 
argue: “At the European level, there exists only a weak system of checks and balances, few 
clear texts providing legal guidance on the attributions of various institutions, and only weak 
protections for the rights of decentralized entities – nation-states or regions. As a result, 
Europe has acquired responsibilities in areas that should remain national or local.” The 
problem of this observed tendency is particularly large if it is combined with a simultaneous 
deepening and enlargement of the EU as emphasized by Alesina, Angeloni and Schuknecht 
(2001, p. 4): “(...) for given distribution of preferences by potential union members and over 
a diverse range of policies, in equilibrium one should observe either small unions that 
centralize many prerogatives, or large unions in which few prerogatives are delegated above 
national governments. This trade off is particularly important when the union is considering 
enlargement. According to this reasoning, enlargement of the union and a deepening of 
coordination of policies are contradictory if the new members and the incumbents are 
heterogeneous.” The point of this is that the net annual benefits in the bad case could be 
quite low for a country like Switzerland which, with its strongly pronounced federalistic 
structure, is much more restrictive regarding power to be given to the federal level. For 
example, tax competition between the 26 cantons is high and important. Also, people can 
take direct influence on major issues as the competences on the cantonal and community 
level are quite wide. Overall, there are good arguments that the net annual benefits which 
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are specific to an EU-accession are, from today’s point of few, considerably lower for 
Switzerland than for the new EU-members--in the good as well as the bad case. This created 
a higher value of waiting for Switzerland in comparison with, for example, the recent new 
members of the European Union. 
 Third, let us discuss the degree and change of uncertainty regarding the pay-offs of 
EU-accession (spread between VtH and VtL). Proposition 1 suggests that an increase in the 
spread (leaving the expected value constant) between the good and the bad case creates a 
higher value of waiting. We argue that this is a reason why Switzerland is less likely to join 
the EU today than this was the case in, for example, the beginning of the nineties. The 
argument is linked to the Constitutional Treaty proposed by the Convent. Whereas Tabellini 
(2003, p. 2) confirms what has been said above about the planned allocation of power--“(…) 
the convention missed a good opportunity to recommend that the EU actions be scaled back 
in some areas where they are unnecessary or harmful”--, Baldwin and Widgren (2003, p. 1) 
focus on the modus for qualified majority voting. They point out that the suggested 
modification will “(…) make it dramatically easier to pass EU legislation thus strongly 
improving the EU’s ‘ability to act’, or what has been called ‘decision-making efficiency’.” 
They show (p. 7) that the „passage probability“ of a legislation proposal increases to the 
same level as it was in the EU-6, even if Bulgaria and Romania are included in a EU-27. 
This implies that the EU-Commission, in its role as agenda setter, will gain power because it 
is much more probable that its proposals pass the Council (p. 16).12 
 Important for our argument is that the range of possible future developments in the 
EU is widened--or from the perspective of our model--the spread between the net annual 
                                                 
12 Vaubel (2004) demonstrates that the proposed Constitutional Treaty would thus aggravate the problem of 
non-representation of voters in decisions by the Council of Ministers. The reason is that the voting in the 
Council is part of a two-stage decision making process (Vaubel (2004, p. 3): “Since the member governments, 
on average, tend to represent no more than, say, 55 per cent of the voters, a Council majority of 72 per cent is 
not likely to represent more than 72 x 0.55 = 40 per cent of the voters -- a minority. If the quorum is lowered to 
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benefits in the good and the bad case increases.13 Of course, the increase of the power of the 
agenda setter institution may be for the good as well as for the bad. It crucially depends on 
the kind of the proposals that will be made by the Commission. The problem is that the 
Constitution leaves too much room for the EU-Commission as Alesina and Perrotti (2004, p. 
17) point out: “(...) the ambiguous wording of Part 1 of the Constitution can be used to 
justify any de facto allocation of competences to EU institutions.” Vaubel (2001) fears that a 
spiral of regulations might be initiated where highly regulated EU-members impose their 
regulation level on all members. Whatever will happen, the new decision rule bears the 
potential to increase the range of possible future developments and, therefore, increases 
uncertainty and the value of waiting for a country such as Switzerland. It seems that 
uncertainty has increased since 1990. The discussed sources of concern were less 
pronounced at the time when the EC was mainly focussing on economic integration, but 
started to arise with the Maastricht treaty (1991), followed by Amsterdam (1997), Nice 
(2000) and the Constitutional Treaty (2004) when political integration became a prominent 
point on the agenda. Also, following Baldwin and Widgren (2003, p. 7), the probability of 
any policy proposal made by the Commission being accepted by the Council will be twice 
as high in 2009 as it was in 1990 if the Constitutional Treaty is accepted. 
 Fourth, the question arises how the costs of accession are likely to develop over time 
(I0 to I1). This is a difficult question. On the one hand, Swiss legislation and policy seems to 
some extent and in some areas to follow the EU approach. This implies a reduction of the 
EU-specific accession costs in future periods which, interestingly, increases the value of 
waiting today (I1 falls compared to I0). From this perspective, one could argue--as some 
proponents of Swiss EU-membership do--that the Bilateral Agreements I and II reduce the 
                                                                                                                                                      
60 per cent, this share drops to one third (60 x 0.55 = 33 per cent).” This is another way of showing that the 
proposed Constitution would make it easier for any policy to be accepted in the Council of Ministers.    
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future accession costs for Switzerland which makes an accession some time in future less 
costly and therefore more likely. This does, of course, not take into account that the net 
benefits will also lower as discussed above. On the other hand, with the deepening of the 
economic integration and liberalization process in the EU, the adjustment costs for a country 
such as Switzerland may increase in a future EU-accession if this liberalization is not 
undertaken independently. Note that this reduces the value of waiting today (I1>I0) and 
makes an immediate accession more likely. 
Fifth, we showed in Proposition 3 that an increase in the probability of the good 
state of nature to take place and/or a reduction of the impatience of people reduces the 
value of waiting. From this perspective, one could argue that if the dispute over the 
Constitutional Treaty is settled and given a “positive twist”, the good case can become more 
likely, which would reduce the value of waiting for Switzerland. Moreover, suppose it is 
true that people are more reluctant to take the burden of adjustment costs and to vote for a 
change if the standard of living is high in the current environment, we could argue that the 
Swiss might be more sceptical about an accession to the EU than people in Eastern 
European countries. In this case, the opportunity costs of joining the EU might be smaller 
for the latter countries than for Switzerland. 
 
Conclusions 
This paper interpreted the decision of a country, such as Switzerland, to join a supranational 
institution, such as the EU, as an irreversible investment under uncertainty. This implies that 
immediate accession may not be optimal despite of the fact that the net present value of 
accession is greater than zero, i.e. the discounted expected net economic and political 
benefits being greater than the discounted costs of accession. As the net benefits are subject 
                                                                                                                                                      
13 In a more complex version of the model, this would be captured by different probability density functions 
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to uncertainty and thus may turn out to be high or low in a later period, waiting has a value 
because it allows staying outside of the supranational institution in case the net benefits are 
low. This value of waiting has to be taken into account in period 0 when a country makes 
the decision “to wait or not to wait”. 
 The simplified two-period model showed a number of interesting comparative statics 
results that were then applied to the Swiss decision about EU-membership. In particular, we 
argued that uncertainty regarding the net annual benefits of an EU-membership increased 
over the last 10 to 15 years and seems quite high in the current environment with the 
pending new Constitutional Treaty. This raises the value of waiting. We then stated that the 
costs of accession seem to be high for Switzerland because of the necessity to change the 
political system to some extent, whereas the net annual benefits of accession are comparably 
low -- at least when compared to countries of Eastern Europe. Both aspects increase the 
value of waiting according to the model. Furthermore, the discussion by other economists 
about the intended level of regulations of various government tasks in the EU revealed that 
the lower bound of the net annual benefits might be low, should the bad case of nature 
occur. The model shows that this increases the value of waiting. An interesting aspect is also 
that exit is unlikely given that the costs of entry are sunk. 
 The analysis remains, at this stage, suggestive. The point we wanted to make is that 
the simplified model can help us to understand more precisely which factors determine the 
value of waiting of a country’s accession to a supranational institution. Based on this 
background, one should be able to analyze and possibly better understand the Swiss and 
other countries’ strategy regarding European integration. The approach could and should of 
course be extended. In particular, it is important to link the model more carefully with the 
Swiss case by using some quantitative analysis. Moreover, accession costs and net annual 
                                                                                                                                                      
over the possible range of outcomes. 
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benefits might be influenced by the decision to join or not to join or used as a strategic 
variable by the countries that are part of the supranational institution. Also, the model is 
based on the idea that overall benefits and costs play an important role in the decision to join 
which, however, some people may debate emphasizing the role of special interest groups in 
the political process. 
An element which we partially considered is the interdependency between a 
“bilateral” approach towards integration and a full EU-membership. In addition to our 
argument that the existence of the Bilateral Agreements I and II reduces the net benefits of 
Swiss-EU membership and thus raises the value of waiting, one could ask more generally 
whether the bilateral path and an EU-membership are independent, separate or 
complementary strategies. In this respect, learning is an important determinant of whether a 
gradual approach to integration dominates a “big bang reform” as shown by Dewatripont 
and Roland (1995, p. 1211): “Informativeness is the key necessary condition for gradualism 
to dominate the big-bang strategy in the sense that learning about the first reform tells 
whether to try the second reform or not (...)”. This “learning”-aspect is also applicable to our 
approach. We could interpret the bilateral path as a learning step towards a closer integration 
in the EU that serves as a reduction of perceived uncertainty. This effect would, to some 
extent, compensate the increase in the value of waiting from reduced net benefits of EU-
membership due to the existence of bilateral agreements. We could then argue that the 
bilateral path does not necessarily dominate an EU-membership, at least not forever, but it 
may be implemented much sooner due to a smaller value to wait.  
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Figure 1: Structure of the Two-Period Model 
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Figure 2: Three-Period Model 
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